Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52 (2003)
|Abstract||Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions.|
|Keywords||Appearance Color Metaphysics Mind Power Property Qualia|
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