Looks as powers
Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52 (2003)
| Abstract | Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Appearance Color Metaphysics Mind Power Property Qualia | |||||||||
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