|Abstract||Methodological naturalism states (roughly speaking) that only science can be a route to knowledge. This purported piece of knowledge looks self-condemning, however; after all, it was formulated in the armchair, and not in the laboratory. I argue that on a popular (if largely unarticulated) construal of naturalism as inference to the best explanation, methodological naturalism escapes this charge of internal incoherence, and in fact is self-endorsing rather than self-condemning.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Robert Audi (2000). Philosophical Naturalism at the Turn of the Century. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:27-45.
Scott F. Aikin (2006). Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology. Human Studies 29 (3):317 - 340.
William Dembski, Can Functional Logic Take the Place of Intelligent Design? A Response to Walter Thorson.
Alexander Paseau (2010). A Puzzle About Naturalism. Metaphilosophy 41 (5):642-648.
Attila Tanyi (2006). Naturalism and Triviality. Philosophical Writings 32 (Summer):12-31.
Hans Fink (2006). Three Sorts of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #53,812 of 549,068 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,186 of 549,068 )
How can I increase my downloads?