David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Episteme 3 (3):156-165 (2006)
The standard image of how consensus can be achieved is by pooling evidence and reducing if not eliminating disagreements. But rather than just pooling substantive evidence on a certain question, why not also take into account the formal, testimonial evidence provided by the fact that a majority of the group adopt a particular answer? Shouldn't we be reinforced by the discovery that we are on that majority side, and undermined by the discovery that we are not? Shouldn't this be so, in particular, when Condorcet's jury theorem applies? It turns out not. There are serious problems attending any strategy of majoritarian deference
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Philip Pettit (2001). A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford University Press.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
Cass R. Sunstein (2002). The Law of Group Polarization. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2):175–195.
David M. Estlund (1994). Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision 36 (2):131-162.
Philip Pettit (2006). When to Defer to Majority Testimony – and When Not. Analysis 66 (291):179–187.
Citations of this work BETA
Boaz Miller (2013). When is Consensus Knowledge Based? Distinguishing Shared Knowledge From Mere Agreement. Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
Similar books and articles
Aviezer Tucker (2003). The Epistemic Significance of Consensus. Inquiry 46 (4):501 – 521.
Benjamin McMyler (2012). Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
Deborah Tollefsen (2007). Group Testimony. Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Axel Gelfert (2010). Reconsidering the Role of Inference to the Best Explanation in the Epistemology of Testimony. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):386-396.
Benjamin McMyler (2007). Knowing at Second Hand. Inquiry 50 (5):511 – 540.
Jeffrey A. Barrett (1996). Oracles, Aesthetics, and Bayesian Consensus. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):280.
Jeremy Wanderer (2012). Addressing Testimonial Injustice: Being Ignored and Being Rejected. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):148-169.
Charlie Pelling (2013). Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
P. Faulkner (2002). On the Rationality of Our Response to Testimony. Synthese 131 (3):353 - 370.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #141,942 of 1,789,728 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #82,722 of 1,789,728 )
How can I increase my downloads?