David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 5 (1):pp. 33-55 (2008)
In this paper I defend a pure proceduralist conception of legitimacy that applies to epistemic democracy. This conception, which I call pure epistemic proceduralism, does not depend on procedure-independent standards for good outcomes and relies on a proceduralist epistemology. It identifies a democratic decision as legitimate if it is the outcome of a process that satisfies certain conditions of political and epistemic fairness. My argument starts with a rejection of instrumentalism – the view that political equality is only instrumentally valuable. I reject instrumentalism on two grounds: (i) because it fails to respect reasonable value pluralism and to recognize the constitutive role of democratic procedures for legitimacy in pluralist societies, and (ii) because it neglects the constructive function of democratic decision-making. I then consider two alternatives to pure epistemic proceduralism: David Estlund's version of epistemic proceduralism and a Deweyan account of epistemic democracy. I argue that only pure epistemic proceduralism can make good on both shortcomings of instrumentalism, whereas each of the other two approaches only makes good on one and neglects the other.
|Keywords||epistemic democracy democratic legitimacy|
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (1993). Political Liberalism. Columbia University Press.
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
David M. Estlund (2009). Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. Princeton University Press.
Helen Longino (2002). The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
John Danaher (2016). The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation. Philosophy and Technology 29 (3):245-268.
Felix Gerlsbeck (forthcoming). What is Democratic Reliability? Epistemic Theories of Democracy and the Problem of Reasonable Disagreement. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-24.
James Gledhill (forthcoming). The Ideal and Reality of Epistemic Proceduralism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
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