Popper's theory of deductive inference and the concept of a logical constant

History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (1):79-110 (1984)
Abstract
This paper deals with Popper's little-known work on deductive logic, published between 1947 and 1949. According to his theory of deductive inference, the meaning of logical signs is determined by certain rules derived from ?inferential definitions? of those signs. Although strong arguments have been presented against Popper's claims (e.g. by Curry, Kleene, Lejewski and McKinsey), his theory can be reconstructed when it is viewed primarily as an attempt to demarcate logical from non-logical constants rather than as a semantic foundation for logic. A criterion of logicality is obtained which is based on conjunction, implication and universal quantification as fundamental logical operations
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Rudolf Carnap (1959). Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Ian Hacking (1978). On the Reality of Existence and Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):613 - 632.

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