Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 181 (3):367-374 (2011)
|Abstract||In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jacob Ross (2010). Sleeping Beauty, Countable Additivity, and Rational Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 119 (4):411 - 447.
Joel Pust (2008). Horgan on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà (2009). Reply to Lewis: Metaphysics Versus Epistemology. Analysis 69 (1):89-91.
Peter J. Lewis (2009). Reply to Papineau and Durà-Vilà. Analysis 69 (1):86-89.
Peter J. Lewis (2007). Quantum Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 67 (293):59-65.
Added to index2009-06-04
Total downloads30 ( #46,485 of 741,433 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,802 of 741,433 )
How can I increase my downloads?