David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 181 (3):367-374 (2011)
In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books, I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences
|Keywords||Sleeping beauty problem Quantum sleeping beauty problem Many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics|
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Arntzenius (2002). Reflections on Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 62 (1):53–62.
Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb (2006). When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments. Analysis 66 (290):119–127.
Cian Dorr (2002). Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga. Analysis 62 (4):292–296.
Adam Elga (2000). Self-Locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Analysis 60 (2):143–147.
Hilary Greaves (2007). Probability in the Everett Interpretation. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):109–128.
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