David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of International Political Theory 3 (1):129-143 (2007)
Critics and defenders of Rawls' idea of public reason have tended to neglect the relationship between this idea and his conception of democratic legitimacy. I shall argue that Rawls' idea of public reason can be interpreted in two different ways, and that the two interpretations support two different conceptions of legitimacy. What I call the substantive interpretation of Rawls' idea of public reason demands that it applies not just to the process of democratic decision-making, but that it extends to the substantive justification of democratic decisions. I shall argue against this interpretation and suggest a procedural interpretation instead. On this view, public reason is invoked when it comes to the political justification of the principles that should govern the process of democratic decision-making, but not – at least not directly – in relation to the content of public deliberation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
John Rawls (1985). Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (3):223-251.
Christian List (2006). The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason. Ethics 116 (2):362-402.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared. Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
Samuel Freeman (2000). Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment. Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (4):371–418.
Citations of this work BETA
Fabienne Peter (2008). Pure Epistemic Proceduralism. Episteme 5 (1):pp. 33-55.
P. E. Digeser (2009). Public Reason and International Friendship. Journal of International Political Theory 5 (1):22-40.
Similar books and articles
Enzo Rossi (2014). Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls' Political Liberalism Versus Gaus' Justificatory Liberalism. Res Publica 20 (1):9-25.
Patrick Neal (2008). Is Public Reason Innocuous? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):131-152.
Christie Hartley & Lori Watson (2009). Feminism, Religion, and Shared Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason. Law and Philosophy 28 (5):493 - 536.
Micah Schwartzman (2004). The Completeness of Public Reason. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):191-220.
Hans von Rautenfeld (2004). Charitable Interpretations: Emerson, Rawls, and Cavell on the Use of Public Reason. Political Theory 32 (1):61-84.
James P. Sterba (1999). Reconciling Public Reason and Religious Values. Social Theory and Practice 25 (1):1-28.
Micah Lott (2006). Restraint on Reasons and Reasons for Restraint: A Problem for Rawls' Ideal of Public Reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):75–95.
J. Pedersen (2012). Justification and Application: The Revival of the Rawls-Habermas Debate. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):399-432.
Fabienne Peter (2007). Democratic Legitimacy and Proceduralist Social Epistemology. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):329-353.
Simon Căbulea May (2009). Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):136-170.
Torben Bech Dyrberg (2005). The Democratic Ideology of Right–Left and Public Reason in Relation to Rawls's Political Liberalism. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 8 (2):161-176.
David A. Reidy (2000). Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. Res Publica 6 (1):49-72.
James Boettcher (2004). What is Reasonableness? Philosophy and Social Criticism 30 (5-6):597-621.
Added to index2011-01-25
Total downloads688 ( #907 of 1,902,047 )
Recent downloads (6 months)113 ( #3,280 of 1,902,047 )
How can I increase my downloads?