David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 61 (4):495-519 (2007)
The rationality of individual agents is secured for the most part by their make-up or design. Some agents, however – in particular, human beings – rely on the intentional exercise of thinking or reasoning in order to promote their rationality further; this is the activity that is classically exempliﬁed in Rodin’s sculpture of Le Penseur. Do group agents have to rely on reasoning in order to maintain a rational proﬁle? Recent results in the theory of judgment aggregation show that under a range of plausible conditions they do. In a slogan: group agents are made, not born.
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2014). What is Inference? Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
András Szigeti (2015). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
Elizabeth Schechter (2012). Intentions and Unified Agency: Insights From the Split-Brain Phenomenon. Mind and Language 27 (5):570-594.
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