Simplicity tracks truth because compression tracks probability
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The simplicity of a theory seems closely related to how well the theory summarizes individual data points. Think, for example, of classic curve-fitting. It is easy to get perfect data-fit with a ‘‘theory’’ that simply lists each point of data, but such a theory is maximally unsimple (for the data-fit). The simple theory suggests instead that there is one underlying curve that summarizes this data, and we usually prefer such a theory even at some expense in data-fit. In general, it seems, theorizing involves looking for regularities or patterns in our experience, and such regularities are interesting to us because they summarize how our experience goes. We could list all the ravens we’ve encountered, and their colors, or we could summarize..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Malcolm R. Forster (1995). The Golfer's Dilemma: A Reply to Kukla on Curve-Fitting. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):348-360.
Peter Turney (1990). The Curve Fitting Problem: A Solution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4):509-530.
Max Coltheart & Martin Davies (2003). Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology. Cortex 39 (1):188-191.
Uljana Feest (2011). What Exactly is Stabilized When Phenomena Are Stabilized? Synthese 182 (1):57-71.
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhayay, Robert J. Boik & Prasun Basu (1996). The Curve Fitting Problem: A Bayesian Approach. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):272.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #98,226 of 1,792,244 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #170,928 of 1,792,244 )
How can I increase my downloads?