David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1993)
What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this novel study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It holds by the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects--this holistic individualism--it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. Within this framework, social theory is allowed to follow any of a number of paths: space is found for intentional interpretation and decision-theoretic reconstruction, for structural explanation and rational choice derivation. But political theory is treated less ecumenically. The framework raises serious questions about contractarian and atomistic modes of thought and it points the way to a republican rethinking of liberal commitments
|Keywords||Intentionality (Philosophy Intentionality (Philosophy Social aspects Social psychology Philosophy Political science Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$33.99 used (57% off) $35.57 new (55% off) $78.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B105.I56.P48 1996|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja (2013). Meta-Externalism Vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
Robert Knowles (2015). Heavy Duty Platonism. Erkenntnis 80 (6):1255-1270.
Sally Haslanger (2016). What is a Structural Explanation? Philosophical Studies 173 (1):113-130.
Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.
Similar books and articles
Deborah Perron Tollefsen (2002). Collective Intentionality and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
J. Krause (2012). Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms: The Scope for a Critical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):323-355.
John Philip Christman (2002). Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge.
James P. Sterba (ed.) (2001). Social and Political Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge.
Bertram F. Malle (2005). Folk Theory of Mind: Conceptual Foundations of Human Social Cognition. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. Oxford University Press 225-255.
Matti Sintonen, Petri Ylikoski & Kaarlo Miller (eds.) (2003). Realism in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
John R. Searle (2009). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford University Press.
Lee McIntyre (2004). Intentionality, Pluralism, and Redescription. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505.
Chukwudum Barnabas Okolo (1993). African Social & Political Philosophy: Selected Essays. Fulladu Pub. Co..
Antti Saaristo (2006). There is No Escape From Philosophy: Collective Intentionality and Empirical Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):40-66.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads71 ( #56,774 of 1,790,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #122,970 of 1,790,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?