David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 26 (1-2):120-138 (2006)
The scientific study of emotion has been characterized by classification schemes that propose to 'carve nature at the joints.' This article examines several of these classifications, drawn from both the categorical and dimensional perspectives. Each classification is given credit for what it contributes to our understanding, but the dream of a single, all purpose taxonomy of emotional phenomena is called into question. Such hopes are often associated with the carving at the joints metaphor, which is here argued to be harmful to scientific realism, and better rejected in favor of a pragmatic approach. Questioning the mere discovery theory of scientific progress, I argue that psychologists discover facts about their domain of study, but have to decide how to classify them. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
|Keywords||classification emotion scientific realism taxonomy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
James A. Russell (2009). Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction. Cognition and Emotion 23 (7):1259-1283.
Similar books and articles
Paul E. Griffiths (1990). Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion. Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.
Charles Starkey (2008). Classifying Emotions: Prospects for a Psychoevolutionary Approach. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):759 – 777.
Stathis Psillos (2005). Scientific Realism and Metaphysics. Ratio 18 (4):385–404.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
Christy Mag Uidhir (2011). The Paradox of Suspense Realism. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2):161-171.
Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Mental Illness as Mental: A Defence of Psychological Realism. Humana.Mente 11:25-44.
Jamin Asay (2013). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
Alex Burri (1996). Realismus in Duhems Naturgemässer Klassifikation. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 27 (2):203 - 213.
Matt L. Drabek (2010). Interactive Classification and Practice in the Social Sciences. Poroi 6 (2):62-80.
Michael Resnik (1995). Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
Michela Massimi (2004). Non‐Defensible Middle Ground for Experimental Realism: Why We Are Justified to Believe in Colored Quarks. Philosophy of Science 71 (1):36-60.
Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism. Palgrave MacMillan.
Louis Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):8-10.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads155 ( #24,466 of 1,911,418 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #319,111 of 1,911,418 )
How can I increase my downloads?