David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95 (2006)
Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. I show that her argument begs important questions. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs
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References found in this work BETA
Albert Casullo (2005). Epistemic Overdetermination and A Priori Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):41-58.
Elizabeth Fricker (1995). Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. Mind 104 (414):393-411.
Elizabeth Fricker (2002). Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
Review author[S.]: Elizabeth Fricker (1995). Critical Notice. Mind 104 (414):393-411.
Christopher J. Insole (2000). Seeing Off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):44-56.
Citations of this work BETA
Benjamin McMyler (2007). Knowing at Second Hand. Inquiry 50 (5):511 – 540.
Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2013). Photographically Based Knowledge. Episteme 10 (3):283-297.
Patrick Rysiew (2007). Beyond Words: Communication, Truthfulness, and Understanding. Episteme 4 (3):285-304.
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