Testimonial justification: Inferential or non-inferential?

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95 (2006)
Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. I show that her argument begs important questions. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00430.x
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References found in this work BETA
Elizabeth Fricker (2002). Trusting Others in the Sciences: A Priori or Empirical Warrant? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):373-383.
By Matthew Weiner (2003). Accepting Testimony. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256–264.

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Citations of this work BETA
Igor Douven & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2009). Fricker on Testimonial Justification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):36-44.

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