The second mistake in moral mathematics is not about the worth of mere participation

Utilitas 16 (3):288-315 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

‘The Second Mistake’ (TSM) is to think that if an act is right or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act. This is not (as some think) a truism, since ‘the effects of this particular act’ and ‘its effects’ need not co-refer. Derek Parfit's rejection of TSM is based mainly on intuitions concerning sets of acts that over-determine certain harms. In these cases, each act belongs to the relevant set in virtue of a causal relation (other than marginal contribution) to a specific harmful event. This feature may make an act wrong, in a fashion consequentialists could admit. That explication of TSM does not rely on the questionable assumption that the set of acts is what harms here. Independently of this, there are several other reasons to prefer it to the ‘mere participation’ approach. Correspondence:c1 [email protected].

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects.Jason Hanna - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):517-531.
Right act, virtuous motive.Thomas Hurka - 2010 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 58-72.
Harming as causing harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag. pp. 137--154.
Scalar properties, binary judgments.Larry Alexander - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):85–104.
On Perfect Goodness.J. Gregory Keller - 2010 - Sophia 49 (1):29-36.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
148 (#123,406)

6 months
18 (#135,873)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Björn Petersson
Lund University

Citations of this work

Essentially Shared Obligations.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
Causing Global Warming.Mattias Gunnemyr - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):399-424.
On individual and shared obligations: in defense of the activist’s perspective.Gunnar Björnsson - forthcoming - In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press.
Collective Omissions and Responsibility.Björn Petersson - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):243-261.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Which effects.Frank Jackson - 1997 - In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. pp. 42--53.
Tendencies.T. S. Champlin - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:119 - 133.

Add more references