David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Utilitas 16 (3):288-315 (2004)
‘The Second Mistake’ (TSM) is to think that if an act is right or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act. This is not (as some think) a truism, since ‘the effects of this particular act’ and ‘its effects’ need not co-refer. Derek Parfit's rejection of TSM is based mainly on intuitions concerning sets of acts that over-determine certain harms. In these cases, each act belongs to the relevant set in virtue of a causal relation (other than marginal contribution) to a specific harmful event. This feature may make an act wrong, in a fashion consequentialists could admit. That explication of TSM does not rely on the questionable assumption that the set of acts is what harms here. Independently of this, there are several other reasons to prefer it to the ‘mere participation’ approach. Correspondence:c1 firstname.lastname@example.org.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Gunnar Björnsson (2014). Essentially Shared Obligations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):103-120.
Björn Petersson (2013). Co-Responsibility and Causal Involvement. Philosophia 41 (3):847-866.
Similar books and articles
Jason Hanna (2011). Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):517-531.
J. Gregory Keller (2010). On Perfect Goodness. Sophia 49 (1):29-36.
Walter Sinnott-armstrong, Ron Mallon, Tom Mccoy & Jay G. Hull (2008). Intention, Temporal Order, and Moral Judgments. Mind and Language 23 (1):90–106.
Larry Alexander (2008). Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):85–104.
Elizabeth Harman (2009). Harming as Causing Harm. In M. A. Roberts & D. T. Wasserman (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer Verlag 137--154.
Thomas Hurka (2010). Right Act, Virtuous Motive. In Heather D. Battaly (ed.), Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell 58-72.
Kelly Sorensen (2010). Effort and Moral Worth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):89 - 109.
Jill Hernandez (2010). Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):403 - 419.
Tyler Cowen (2006). The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism. Utilitas 18 (04):383-.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #175,574 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?