Utilitarian epistemology

Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184 (2013)
Abstract
Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility
Keywords Epistemology  Utilitarianism  Epistemic value  Meno problem  Value of knowledge  Justification  Responsibility  Epistemic justification  Epistemic responsibility
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.

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