Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184 (2013)
|Abstract||Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility|
|Keywords||Epistemology Utilitarianism Epistemic value Meno problem Value of knowledge Justification Responsibility Epistemic justification Epistemic responsibility|
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