David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):71-82 (2012)
This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are ‘roughly equal’) if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective
|Keywords||Virtue Ethics Choice Parity On a par Aristotle|
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Philippa Foot (2001). Natural Goodness. Oxford University Press.
John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
Martha C. Nussbaum (1990). Love's Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Ruth Chang (2002). The Possibility of Parity. Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
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