David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Analysis 66 (291):179–187 (2006)
How sensitive should you be to the testimony of others? You saw the car that caused an accident going through trafﬁc lights on the red; or so you thought. Should you revise your belief on discovering that the majority of bystanders, equally well-equipped, equally well-positioned and equally impartial, reported that it went through on the green? Or take another case. You believe that intelligent design is the best explanation for the order of the living universe. Should you revise that belief on ﬁnding that most other people, or at least most who by your own lights are as intelligent, informed and impartial as yourself, believe that evolutionary theory offers the better account? Should you do this, in particular, if your own personal sense of where the evidence points – like your own vivid memory of the car going through on the red – remains ﬁrmly on the side of intelligent design? Assume, to take a third case, that there is a matter of fact about whether abortion is right or wrong. You believe that it is wrong, having a ﬁrm picture of it as an act on a par with murder. Should you revise that belief on discovering that among those whom you regard as equally intelligent, informed and impartial, most believe that abortion is not wrong, or at least not wrong in the way that murder is wrong? Should you do this, in particular, if your own personal sense of abortion remains unchanged; it still seems to you to be a grievous wrong? Should you put aside your own sense of things as mistaken, in the way you might put aside your imagined memory of the car going through on the red, and decide to go along with the majority view?
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References found in this work BETA
David M. Estlund (1994). Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet's Jury Theorem. Theory and Decision 36 (2):131-162.
Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem? In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. Routledge.
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Citations of this work BETA
David Christensen (2009). Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.
Robert Mark Simpson (2013). Epistemic Peerhood and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):561-577.
Peter Forrest (2009). The Philosophical Scandal of the Wrong Kind of Religious Disagreement. Sophia 48 (2):151-166.
Christian List (2012). The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review. Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
Fabrizio Cariani (2011). Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):22-32.
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