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- Andrés Páez, The Epistemic Value of Explanation.In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically valuable to an inquiring agent and to a scientific community. To be potentially explanatory, the information must state the relations of probabilistic relevance that the explanans bares to the explanandum. But a potential explanation con only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate the epistemic value of a potential explanation as a function of its credibility and its informational content.
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The controversy about intentional explanation of action concerns how these explanations work. What kind of model allows us to capture the dependency or relevance relation between the explanans, i.e. the beliefs and desires of the agent, and the explanandum, i.e. the action? In this paper, I argue that the causal mechanical model can do the job. Causal mechanical intentional explanations consist in a reference to the mechanisms of practical reasoning of the agent that motivated the agent to act, i.e. to a causally relevant set of beliefs and desires. Moreover, the causal mechanical model can provide in efficient and unproblematic applications, unlike action explanations using ceteris paribus laws or counterfactuals. The drawback of the latter models of explanation is their modal requirement: the explanans must mention or implies sufficient and/or necessary conditions for the explanandum. Such a requirement is too strong when it comes to intentional explanation of action.
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| Export citation | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: informaworld.com tandfonline.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Knowledge seems to be a good thing, or at least better than epistemic states that fall short of it, such as true belief. Understanding too seems to be a good thing, perhaps better even than knowledge. In a number of recent publications, Duncan Pritchard tries to account for the value of understanding by claiming that understanding is a cognitive achievement and that achievements in general are valuable. In this paper, I argue that coming to understand something need not be an achievement, and so Pritchard’s explanation of understanding’s value fails. Next, I point out that Pritchard’s is just one of many attempts to account for the value of an epistemic state—whether it be understanding, knowledge, or whatever—by appeal to the notion of achievement or, more generally, the notion of success because of ability. Tentatively, I offer reasons to be sceptical about the prospects of any such account.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... ‘Scientific integrity’ certainly requires that data and references be beyond reproach. However, issues within the theory of scientific explanation suggest that there may be more to it than just this. While it is true that some contemporary, pragmatic analyses of explanation suffer from the ‘problem of relevance’ (an inability to ensure that explanations which are paradigmatic technically are relevant to the question being posed), it does not seem to be true that the addition of formal, metaphysical constraints is necessary to solve this problem. I argue that, when viewed as requests for help with an epistemic problem, explanation-seeking questions reveal the existence of a set of moral criteria centered in trust which, when satisfied, prevent trivial or irrelevant explanations from being offered, thereby broadening the concept of ‘scientific integrity’.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Scientific explanation in terms of laws and initial conditions (or better, in terms of objects with powers and liabilities) is contrasted with personal explanation in terms of agents with powers and purposes. In each case the factors involved in explanation may themselves be explained, and infinite regress of explanation is logically possible. There can be no absolute explanation of phenomena, which is explanation in terms of the logically necessary; but there can be ultimate explanation which is explanation in terms of factors which themselves have no explanation. Our normal criteria of explanation suggest that the explanation of the universe lies in the action of God.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Bo kovi 's explanatory procedure and his concept of explanation represents a certain departure from Newton's causal theory and his theory of explanation. Apart from particular elements of causal explanation, Bo kovi developed an alternative, non-causal explanatory strategy. In this paper two different elements of this strategy are discussed: (i) the micro-reductive explanatory strategy based on Bo kovi 's idea of determination, and (ii) a type of explanation of a theory by means of a more general law, through a thought-experiment. In addition, an outline of the proposed (iii) 'argument theory' of explanation in his mature period is made. These aspects are considered with respect to the realist and anti-realist elements in Bo kovi 's epistemology.
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| | Other links: tandfonline.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Approaches to explanation -- Causal and explanatory relevance -- The kairetic account of /D making -- The kairetic account of explanation -- Extending the kairetic account -- Event explanation and causal claims -- Regularity explanation -- Abstraction in regularity explanation -- Approaches to probabilistic explanation -- Kairetic explanation of frequencies -- Kairetic explanation of single outcomes -- Looking outward -- Looking inward.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Understanding without explanation? Impossible, or so I will argue – in the case of science, at least. More particularly, I defend in this paper a version of the following simple view concerning the connection between scientific explanation and understanding: scientific understanding is that state produced, and only produced, by grasping a correct explanation. The simple view, I will conclude, ought to be regarded as one part of a bigger picture, in which "understanding why", "understanding that", and "understanding with" are distinguished. But the central idea, that scientific understanding is a matter of having the right epistemic relation to an explanation or explanations, will remain untouched.
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| | Scholar | More options ... A central intuition many epistemologists seem to have is that knowledge is distinctively valuable. In his paper 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Duncan Pritchard rejects the virtue-theoretic explanation of this intuition. This explanation says that knowledge is distinctively valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. It is maintained, in the first place, that the arguments Pritchard musters against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement are unconvincing. It is argued, in the second place, that even if the arguments against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement were convincing, there is another explanation of the intuition that knowledge has final value available: the question-relative treatment of knowledge.
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | My bibliography | Export citation | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ...
| | Other links: blackwell-synergy.com dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Explanatory inquiry characteristically begins with a certain puzzlement about the world. But why do certain situations elicit our puzzlement (or curiosity) while others leave us, in some epistemically relevant sense, cold? Moreover, what exactly is involved in the move from a state of puzzlement to a state where one's puzzlement is satisfied? In this paper I try to answer both of these questions. I also suggest ways in which our account of scientific rationality might benefit from having a better sense of the kind of epistemic goal we are trying to realize, when we engage in our explanatory inquiries. Two Senses The Need for Explanation An Example Proto-understanding Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
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| | Other links: bjps.oxfordjournals.org jstor.org dx.doi.org | Scholar | At my library | More options ... We formulate a version of the Cosmological Argument that deploys an epistemic principle of explanation in place of the traditional Principle of Sufficient Reason. The epistemic principle asserts that if there is a possible explanation of a fact, and some proposition is entailed by that explanation and by every other possible explanation of that fact, it is reasonable to accept that proposition. We try to show that there is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings and that any possible explanation of this fact presupposes that there is a necessary being. We conclude that it is reasonable to believe that there is a necessary being.
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| | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Discussion of Andrés Páez, The epistemic value of explanation
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