A probability logical interpretation of fallacies

In G. Kreuzbauer, N. Gratzl & E. Hiebl (eds.), Rhetorische Wissenschaft: Rede Und Argumentation in Theorie Und Praxis. Lit 225--244 (2008)
This chapter presents a probability logical approach to fallacies. A special interpretation of (subjective) probability is used, which is based on coherence. Coherence provides not only a foundation of probability theory, but also a normative standard of reference for distinguishing fallacious from non-fallacious arguments. The violation of coherence is sufficient for an argument to be fallacious. The inherent uncertainty of everyday life argumentation is captured by attaching degrees of belief to the premises. Probability logic analyzes the structure of the argument and deduces the uncertainty of the conclusion from the premises. The approach is illustrated by prominent examples of fallacies, like the argumentum ad ignorantiam, affirming the consequent and the conjunction fallacy
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