Inference in conditional probability logic
Kybernetika 42 (2):391--404 (2006)
| Abstract | An important field of probability logic is the investigation of inference rules that propagate point probabilities or, more generally, interval probabilities from premises to conclusions. Conditional probability logic (CPL) interprets the common sense expressions of the form “if . . . , then . . . ” by conditional probabilities and not by the probability of the material implication. An inference rule is probabilistically informative if the coherent probability interval of its conclusion is not necessarily equal to the unit interval [0, 1]. Not all logically valid inference rules are probabilistically informative and vice versa. The relationship between logically valid and probabilistically informative inference rules is discussed and illustrated by examples such as the modus ponens or the affirming the consequent. We propose a method to evaluate the strength of CPL inference | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesNiki Pfeifer (2006). On Mental Probability Logic. Dissertation, Department of Psychology
Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2006). Is Human Reasoning About Nonmonotonic Conditionals Probabilistically Coherent? In Proceedings of the 7 T H Workshop on Uncertainty Processing.
Stephen Spielman (1976). Bayesian Inference with Indeterminate Probabilities. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:185 - 196.
Peter Milne (2012). Indicative Conditionals, Conditional Probabilities, and the “Defective Truth-Table”: A Request for More Experiments. Thinking and Reasoning 18 (2):196 - 224.
Stefan Kaufmann (2004). Conditioning Against the Grain. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (6):583-606.
Robert C. Stalnaker (1970). Probability and Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.
Herman Dishkant (1980). Three Prepositional Calculi of Probability. Studia Logica 39 (1):49 - 61.
Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2007). Human Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities: Modus Ponens and Denying the Antecedent. In Proceedings of the 5 T H International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications.
Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn (2012). REWARD VERSUS RISK IN UNCERTAIN INFERENCE: THEOREMS AND SIMULATIONS. The Review of Symbolic Logic.
Theodore Hailperin (1991). Probability Logic in the Twentieth Century. History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (1):71-110.
Roger M. Cooke (1986). Probabilistic Reasoning in Expert Systems Reconstructed in Probability Semantics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:409 - 421.
James Hawthorne (1996). On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):185-218.
Igor Douven (2008). Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3).
Eyvind Ohm & Valerie A. Thompson (2006). Conditional Probability and Pragmatic Conditionals: Dissociating Truth and Effectiveness. Thinking and Reasoning 12 (3):257 – 280.
Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2010). The Conditional in Mental Probability Logic. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (eds.), Cognition and Conditionals: Probability and Logic in Human Thought. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-04-22Total downloads13 ( #87,887 of 549,070 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,185 of 549,070 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
