Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbers

Journal of Philosophical Research 17:347-50 (1992)
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Abstract

This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails

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Searle's chinese room argument.Larry Hauser - unknown - Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
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Karl Pfeifer
University of Saskatchewan

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