Journal of Philosophical Research 17:347-50 (1992)
|Abstract||This paper defends Searle against the misconstrual of a key claim of “Minds, Brains, and Programs” and goes on to explain why an attempt to turn the tables by using the Chinese Room to argue for intentionality in computers fails|
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Brain Epistemology Mind Cam, P Searle, J|
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