On Frege's Alleged Indispensability Argument

Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):160-173 (2005)
The expression ‘indispensability argument’ denotes a family of arguments for mathematical realism supported among others by Quine and Putnam. More and more often, Gottlob Frege is credited with being the first to state this argument in section 91 of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Frege's alleged indispensability argument is the subject of this essay. On the basis of three significant differences between Mark Colyvan's indispensability arguments and Frege's applicability argument, I deny that Frege presents an indispensability argument in that very often quoted section of the Grundegesetze
Keywords Frege  Indispensability Argument  Colyvan
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    Mark Colyvan (1998). In Defence of Indispensability. Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62.
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