Efferent Information Processing, Ethics, and the Categories of Action

Abstract

Over centuries, philosophers have theorised about what constitutes ‘the good’ regarding behavioural choice. Characteristically, these attempts have tried to decipher the nature and substantive values that link the apparent trichotomous nature of the human psyche, variously articulated in terms of human reasoning, feeling, and desiring. Of the three, most emphasis has focused on the unique human characteristic of reasoned behavioural choice in terms of its relationship to the emotions. This article determines the principle dynamics behind 'ethical' behaviour: In the nervous system, efferent nerves, otherwise known as motor neurones, carry nerve impulses away from the central nervous system to effectors such as muscles. A great deal of neural activity underpins‘efferent information processing’. What follows is a categorisation of the structure of 'efferent information processing' in a manner, that enhances our understanding of the attempts of philosophers, from Plato to Russell, to explain ‘what it is to be behave well’.

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