Evidence that Stakes Don't Matter for Evidence
Philosophical Psychology:1-25 (forthcoming)
| Abstract | Some philosophers have recently defended anti-intellectualism with respect to knowledge and evidence. In this paper, I assess anti-intellectualism about evidence. Proponents of anti-intellectualism generally regard their view as not at all obvious, but nonetheless strongly supported by appeal to our intuitive judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases. Anti-intellectualism is thus taken by its proponents to be a surprising truth. I show that, though peoples’ intuitive judgments about the general issue of whether or not non-epistemic factors make an epistemic difference are often in line with anti-intellectualism, their judgments about whether particular epistemic properties are instantiated in hypothetical cases do not display a pattern that would clearly support anti-intellectualism about evidence. Thus, anti-intellectualism about evidence is not entirely surprising, and intuitive assessments of hypothetical cases do not support its truth. | |||||||||
| Keywords | evidence epistemology pragmatic encroachment stakes anti-intellectualism interest-relative invariantism experimental | |||||||||
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