Philosophical Studies 138 (2):291 - 298 (2008)
|Abstract||Recent and puzzling experimental results suggest that people’s judgments as to whether or not an action was performed intentionally are sensitive to moral considerations. In this paper, we outline these results and evaluate two accounts which purport to explain them. We then describe a recent experiment that allegedly vindicates one of these accounts and present our own findings to show that it fails to do so. Finally, we present additional data suggesting no such vindication could be in the offing and that, in fact, both accounts fail to explain the initial, puzzling results they were purported to explain|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alfred R. Mele (2003). Intentional Action: Controversies, Data, and Core Hypotheses. Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):325-340.
Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
Joshua Knobe (2008). Folk Psychology: Science and Morals. In Daniel Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Reassessed. Springer Press.
Roblin R. Meeks (2004). Unintentionally Biasing the Data: Reply to Knobe. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):220-223.
Dean Pettit & Joshua Knobe (2009). The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (5):586-604.
Joshua Knobe Gabriel Mendlow, The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology.
Mark Phelan & Hagop Sarkissian (2009). Is the 'Trade-Off Hypothesis' Worth Trading For? Mind and Language 24 (2):164-180.
Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob (2012). On Doing Things Intentionally. Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004). Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #29,838 of 549,119 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,119 )
How can I increase my downloads?