David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725 (2013)
According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various mental state ascriptions to groups. These studies seem to reveal that people are more inclined to think of groups as having intentionality than as having phenomenology. Combined with the fact that groups obviously lack a single biological body, this has been taken as evidence that people operate according to the relevant discontinuity. However, these studies support discontinuity only on the assumption that the experimental participants are interpreting the relevant group mental state ascriptions in a specific way. We present evidence that people are not interpreting these ascriptions in a way that supports discontinuity. Instead, we argue that people generally interpret group mental state ascriptions distributively, as attributions of mental states to various group members.
|Keywords||Phenomenal consciousness Collective intentionality Linguistic pragmatics Methodology Experimental philosophy Philosophy of sociology Group minds|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Margaret Gilbert (1989). On Social Facts. Routledge.
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
Terence Horgan & John Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. OUP Usa 520--533.
Citations of this work BETA
Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess (2016). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3).
Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2013). Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2015). If Materialism is True, the United States is Probably Conscious. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.
Geoffrey P. Goodwin (2015). Experimental Approaches to Moral Standing. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):914-926.
Similar books and articles
Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
Adam Arico (2010). Folk Psychology, Consciousness, and Context Effects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):371-393.
Justin Sytsma (2010). Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 5 (8):700-711.
Mark Phelan & Wesley Buckwalter (2012). Analytic Functionalism and Mental State Attribution. Philosophical Topics 40 (2):129-154.
Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2014). Phenomenal Consciousness Disembodied. In Justin Sytsma (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind. Bloomsbury 45-74.
Natika Newton (1985). Acting and Perceiving in Body and Mind. Philosophy Research Archives 11:407-429.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Tim Crane (2003). The Intentional Structure of Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press 33-56.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Tim Crane (2009). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press 474--493.
Adam Arico, Brian Fiala, Robert F. Goldberg & Shaun Nichols (2011). The Folk Psychology of Consciousness. Mind and Language 26 (3):327-352.
Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2009). How to Study Folk Intuitions About Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):21 – 35.
Jose S. Pescador Hierro (1997). Problemas del empirismo en la filosofía de la mente. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):35-49.
Tim Crane (forthcoming). Intentionality. Philosophical Explorations.
Added to index2012-09-16
Total downloads72 ( #57,379 of 1,793,156 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #46,919 of 1,793,156 )
How can I increase my downloads?