David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 4 (1-2):73-82 (1983)
A common assumption among philosophers is that every language has at most denumerably many expressions. This assumption plays a prominent role in many philosophical arguments. Recently formal systems with indenumerably many elements have been developed. These systems are similar to the more familiar denumerable first-order languages. This similarity makes it appear that the assumption is false. We argue that the assumption is true
|Keywords||denumerably many expressions indenumerably many expressions|
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References found in this work BETA
John Corcoran, William Frank & Michael Maloney (1974). String Theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (4):625-637.
Alfred Tarski (1956). Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
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