Classical logic and truth-value gaps

Philosophical Papers 21 (2):141-150 (1992)
An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends this approach is (1) its relative simplicity, and (2) the fact that it leaves the fundamental features of classical logic intact.
Keywords Kleene  truth-value gaps  bivalence
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DOI 10.1080/05568649209506377
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