David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 134 (2):183 - 210 (2007)
On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint can take two forms. One can adopt either a broadly externalist model of inference or a sceptical stance. I will attempt, in what follows, to defend a version of internalism which is not affected by the regress. The main strategy will be to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice, and then to suggest an internalist alternative.
|Keywords||epistemology externalism inference internalism logic scepticism|
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References found in this work BETA
Lewis Carroll (1895). What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4 (14):278-280.
Donald Davidson (1970). How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral Concepts. Oxford University Press.
Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-241.
Crispin Wright (2001). On Basic Logical Knowledge; Reflections on Paul Boghossian's "How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?''. Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):41 - 85.
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