David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):808 - 827 (2011)
It is obvious both that some changes are too small for us to perceive and that we can perceive constant motion. Yet according to Fara, these two facts are in conflict, and one must be rejected. I show that conflict arises only from accepting a `zoëtrope conception' of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content. On pain of denying the phenomenologically obvious, we must reject the zoëtrope conception. I offer an alternative account, according to which the dynamic content of our experience at short timescales is metaphysically dependent on the content of experience over longer timescales. Moreover, at short timescales such content is purely determinable
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jiri Benovsky (2013). The Present Vs. The Specious Present. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):193-203.
Similar books and articles
Fiona Macpherson (2006). Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.
Geoffrey Hinchliffe (2011). What is a Significant Educational Experience? Journal of Philosophy of Education 45 (3):417-431.
William L. McBride (1981). Sartre and Lived Experience. Research in Phenomenology 11 (1):75-89.
Richard Schantz (2001). The Given Regained: Reflections on the Sensuous Content of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):167-180.
Michael Pelczar (2010). Presentism, Eternalism, and Phenomenal Change. Synthese 176 (2):275 - 290.
Ian Phillips (2009). Experience and Time. Dissertation, UCL
Philippe Chuard (2007). Indiscriminable Shades and Demonstrative Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):277 – 306.
Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
Delia Graff Fara (2001). Phenomenal Continua and the Sorites. Mind 110 (440):905-935.
Michael Luntley (2010). Expectations Without Content. Mind and Language 25 (2):217-236.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #35,901 of 1,101,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #44,461 of 1,101,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?