David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202 (2010)
Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness—specious present theories and memory theories—are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is possible within the constraints of this principle. I argue that the principle is false. Neither theory of temporal awareness can be made workable unless it is rejected. Our experience of temporal phenomena cannot be understood if we attempt to break experience down into instantaneous slices. In order to understand the perception of temporal properties we must look beyond the instant.
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References found in this work BETA
William James (1890/1981). The Principles of Psychology. Dover Publications.
Immanuel Kant (1998). Critique of Pure Reason (Translated and Edited by Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood). Cambridge.
Immanuel Kant (2007/1991). Critique of Pure Reason. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 449-451.
Citations of this work BETA
Ian B. Phillips (2011). Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show. Mind and Language 26 (4):381-411.
Samuel Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Maria Kon & Kristie Miller (2015). Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy Compass 10 (8):560-571.
Simon Prosser (2012). Why Does Time Seem to Pass? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):92-116.
Mauro Dorato (2015). Presentism and the Experience of Time. Topoi 34 (1):265-275.
Oliver Rashbrook (2013). An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
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