Quine's relativism

Ratio 3 (2):142-149 (1990)
A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.
Keywords Quine  truth  bivalence  Platonism  disquotational theory of truth
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1990.tb00020.x
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