David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Investigations 3 (4):38-46 (1980)
Despite wittgenstein's commitment to philosophy as a practice designed to free us from the impulse to generate philosophical theories, it seems to the author that wittgenstein did have a theory of knowledge in "on certainty". the paper is devoted to displaying this theory; it is written in the hope that others will find a way of reading "on certainty" that frees it from this interpretation
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