Are prototypes and exemplars used in distinct cognitive processes?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):226 - 227 (2010)
We argue that Machery provides no convincing evidence that prototypes and exemplars are typically used in distinct cognitive processes. This partially undermines the fourth tenet of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and thus casts doubts on Machery’s way of splitting concepts into different kinds. Although Machery may be right that concepts split into different kinds, such kinds may be different from those countenanced by the Heterogeneity Hypothesis.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X10000488
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