Are Prototypes and Exemplars Used in Distinct Cognitive Processes?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):226-227 (2010)
Machery’s argument that concepts split into different kinds is bold and inspiring but not fully persuasive. We will focus on the lack of evidence for the fourth tenet of Machery’s..
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X10000488
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Collin Rice (2014). Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.

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