A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism

Philosophers' Imprint 12 (6) (2012)
Abstract
Ostrich nominalists often cite Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in order to claim that their view is more parsimonious than rival positions in ontology such as realism. We show that Quine’s criterion, properly understood, does not support this claim. Indeed, we show that ostrich nominalism has a far more profligate ontology than realism
Keywords Ostrich nominalism
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Giuliano Torrengo (2014). Ostrich Presentism. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.
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