David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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The following three theses are inconsistent: (1) (Paradigmatic) connectionist systems perform computations. (2) Performing computations requires executing programs. (3) Connectionist systems do not execute programs. Many authors embrace (2). This leads them to a dilemma: either connectionist systems execute programs or they don't compute. Accordingly, some authors attempt to deny (1), while others attempt to deny (3). But as I will argue, there are compelling reasons to accept both (1) and (3). So, we should replace (2) with a more satisfactory account of computation. Once we do, we can see more clearly what is peculiar to connectionist computation
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Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computing Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
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