David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532 (2009)
Computationalism has been the mainstream view of cognition for decades. There are periodic reports of its demise, but they are greatly exaggerated. This essay surveys some recent literature on computationalism. It concludes that computationalism is a family of theories about the mechanisms of cognition. The main relevant evidence for testing it comes from neuroscience, though psychology and AI are relevant too. Computationalism comes in many versions, which continue to guide competing research programs in philosophy of mind as well as psychology and neuroscience. Although our understanding of computationalism has deepened in recent years, much work in this area remains to be done
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Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Resilience of Computationalism. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):852-861.
Nicoletta Orlandi (2013). Embedded Seeing: Vision in the Natural World. Noûs 47 (4):727-747.
Thomas W. Polger (2010). Mechanisms and Explanatory Realization Relations. Synthese 177 (2):193 - 212.
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