Computationalism, the church–turing thesis, and the church–turing fallacy

Synthese 154 (1):97-120 (2007)
Abstract
The Church–Turing Thesis (CTT) is often employed in arguments for computationalism. I scrutinize the most prominent of such arguments in light of recent work on CTT and argue that they are unsound. Although CTT does nothing to support computationalism, it is not irrelevant to it. By eliminating misunderstandings about the relationship between CTT and computationalism, we deepen our appreciation of computationalism as an empirical hypothesis.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/27653444
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References found in this work BETA
B. Jack Copeland (2002). Hypercomputation. Minds and Machines 12 (4):461-502.
Alan Turing (1936). On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 42 (1):230-265.
B. Jack Copeland (2008). The Church-Turing Thesis. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University

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