David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (2):185-195 (2013)
It is commonly thought that mental disorder is a valid concept only in so far as it is an extension of or continuous with the concept of physical disorder. A valid extension has to meet two criteria: determination and coherence. Essentialists meet these criteria through necessary and sufficient conditions for being a disorder. Two Wittgensteinian alternatives to essentialism are considered and assessed against the two criteria. These are the family resemblance approach and the secondary sense approach. Where the focus is solely on the characteristics or attributes of things, both these approaches seem to fail to meet the criteria for valid extension. However, this focus on attributes is mistaken. The criteria for valid extension are met in the case of family resemblance by the pattern of characteristics associated with a concept, and by the limits of intelligibility of applying a concept. Secondary sense, though it may have some claims to be a good account of the relation between physical and mental disorder, cannot claim to meet the two criteria of valid extension
|Keywords||Mental disorder Essentialism Wittgenstein Family resemblance Secondary sense Extension of concepts|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (2010). What Metaphors Mean. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Critical Inquiry. Routledge 31.
Thomas S. Szasz (2004). The Myth of Mental Illness. In Arthur Caplan, James J. McCartney & Dominic A. Sisti (eds.), Ethics. Georgetown University Press 43--50.
Christopher Boorse (1977). Health as a Theoretical Concept. Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
Richard Boyd (1991). Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):127-48.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Bengt Brülde (2007). Mental Disorder and Values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.
Alfredo Gaete (2009). The Concept of Mental Disorder: A Proposal. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (4):327-339.
Hanne Andersen (2000). Kuhn's Account of Family Resemblance: A Solution to the Problem of Wide-Open Texture. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 52 (3):313-337.
Dusan Kecmanovic (2011). Why the Mental Disorder Concept Matters. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (1):1-9.
Serife Tekin (2011). Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.
Patricia A. Ross (2005). Sorting Out the Concept Disorder. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 26 (2):115-140.
Massimiliano Aragona (2009). The Concept of Mental Disorder and the DSM-V. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 2 (1):1-14.
Michael Pelczar (2000). Wittgensteinian Semantics. Noûs 34 (4):483–516.
Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
Hans Sluga (2006). Family Resemblance. Grazer Philosophische Studien 71 (1):1-21.
George Graham (2010). The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness. Routledge.
Paweł Rojek (2007). Podobieństwa rodzinne i konkretne uniwersalia. Filozofia Nauki 1.
Somogy Varga (2011). Defining Mental Disorder. Exploring the 'Natural Function' Approach. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6 (1):1-.
Added to index2011-12-14
Total downloads16 ( #163,768 of 1,724,852 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #349,138 of 1,724,852 )
How can I increase my downloads?