Functionalism, Computationalism, & Mental States

Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions.
Keywords functionalsim  computationalism  computational functionalism  mental states  computational theory of mind  functional analysis
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.02.003
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Robert C. Cummins (1975). Functional Analysis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
D. C. Dennett (1975). Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 5 (2):169–188.

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Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computing Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):32–73.

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