Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410 (2004)
Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
Keywords Computationalism  Foundationalism  Mental Content  Metaphysics  Semantics
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DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.02.003
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Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computing Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2008). Computers. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):32–73.

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