Graduate studies at Western
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410 (2004)
|Abstract||Some philosophers have conﬂated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conﬂation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions. # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved|
|Keywords||Computationalism Foundationalism Mental Content Metaphysics Semantics|
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