Kerry und frege über begriff und gegenstand1
History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):9-32 (1994)
| Abstract | After describing the philosophical background of Kerry?s work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano?s conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege?s work and Kerry?s views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: (a) the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; (b) the logical roles of the definite article.Not only did Frege in 1892 offer an unconvincing solution to Kerry?s puzzle concerning ?the concept horse? but he also overlooked the many criticisms levelled by Kerry against the notion of an (indefinite) extension on which his own definition of number was based | |||||||||
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Terence Parsons (1986). Why Frege Should Not Have Said "The Concept Horse is Not a Concept". History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):449 - 465.
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Ivan Welty (2011). Frege on Indirect Proof. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (3):283-290.
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