David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (2):253-277 (2010)
In order to accommodate his view that quantifiers are predicates of predicates within a type theory, Frege introduces a rule which allows a function name to be formed by removing a saturated name from another saturated name which contains it. This rule requires that each name has a rather rich syntactic structure, since one must be able to recognize the occurrences of a name in a larger name. However, I argue that Frege is unable to account for this syntactic structure. I argue that this problem undermines the inductive portion of Frege's proof that all of the names of his system denote in §§29–32 of The Basic Laws
|Keywords||philosophy of logic Frege's proof of referentiality|
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