The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism

Abstract
Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism may or may not legitimately come together
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References found in this work BETA
Eric B. Baum (2004). What Is Thought? Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Justin Garson (2013). The Functional Sense of Mechanism. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):317-333.
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