Mind and Language 18 (4):440-446 (2003)
|Abstract||Paul Pietroski presents an original philosophical theory of actions and their mental causes. We often act for reasons, deliberating and choosing among options, based on our beliefs and desires. But because bodily motions always have biochemical causes, it can seem that thinking and acting are biochemical processes. Pietroski argues that thoughts and deeds are in fact distinct from, though dependent on, underlying biochemical processes within persons|
|Keywords||Action Causation Dualism Metaphysics Frege|
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|Call number||B105.A35.P54 2000|
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