David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (3):211-228 (2005)
This paper is a discussion of Gödel's arguments for a Platonistic conception of mathematical objects. I review the arguments that Gödel offers in different papers, and compare them to unpublished material (from Gödel's Nachlass). My claim is that Gödel's later arguments simply intend to establish that mathematical knowledge cannot be accounted for by a reflexive analysis of our mental acts. In other words, there is at the basis of mathematics some data whose constitution cannot be explained by introspective analysis. This does not mean that mathematics is independent of the human mind, but only that it is independent of our ?conscious acts and decisions?, to use Gödel's own words. Mathematical objects may then have been created by the human mind, but if so, the process of creation cannot be completely analysed and re-enacted. Such a thesis is weaker than some of the statements that Gödel made about his conceptual realism. However, there is evidence that Gödel seriously considered this weak thesis, or a position depending only on this weak thesis. He also criticized Husserl's Phenomenology from this point of view
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References found in this work BETA
Van Atten Mark & Kennedy Juliette (2003). On the Philosophical Development of Kurt Gödel. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):425-476.
Paolo Mancosu (1999). Between Vienna and Berlin: The Immediate Reception of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems. History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (1):33-45.
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