Gödel and 'the objective existence' of mathematical objects
History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (3):211-228 (2005)
| Abstract | This paper is a discussion of Gödel's arguments for a Platonistic conception of mathematical objects. I review the arguments that Gödel offers in different papers, and compare them to unpublished material (from Gödel's Nachlass). My claim is that Gödel's later arguments simply intend to establish that mathematical knowledge cannot be accounted for by a reflexive analysis of our mental acts. In other words, there is at the basis of mathematics some data whose constitution cannot be explained by introspective analysis. This does not mean that mathematics is independent of the human mind, but only that it is independent of our ?conscious acts and decisions?, to use Gödel's own words. Mathematical objects may then have been created by the human mind, but if so, the process of creation cannot be completely analysed and re-enacted. Such a thesis is weaker than some of the statements that Gödel made about his conceptual realism. However, there is evidence that Gödel seriously considered this weak thesis, or a position depending only on this weak thesis. He also criticized Husserl's Phenomenology from this point of view | |||||||||
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G. Sereny (2011). How Do We Know That the Godel Sentence of a Consistent Theory Is True? Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):47-73.
Kurt Gödel, Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons & Stephen G. Simpson (eds.) (2010). Kurt Gödel: Essays for His Centennial. Association for Symbolic Logic.
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John W. Dawson Jr & Cheryl A. Dawson (2005). Future Tasks for Gödel Scholars. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):150 - 171.
John W. Dawson Jr & Cheryl A. Dawson (2005). Future Tasks for Gödel Scholars. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):150 - 171.
Mark Steiner (2001). Wittgenstein as His Own Worst Enemy: The Case of Gödel's Theorem. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):257-279.
Richard Tieszen (1992). Kurt Godel and Phenomenology. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):176-194.
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