Gadamer on the Relation Between Philosophy and Its History

Idealistic Studies 35 (1):21-33 (2005)
This article asks what Gadamerian hermeneutics can contribute to recent debates about how philosophy is related to its history. First, I explain how Gadamer understands this relation, paying particular attention to his debts to Heidegger and to the role of tradition in the human sciences. Next, I argue that Gadamer’s view raises serious difficulties—difficulties connected with what he calls historicalconsciousness. Finally, I try to respond to these difficulties by distinguishing two different ways of understanding what historians of philosophy do. While my response is in some tension with what Gadamer explicitly says about the history of philosophy, it is, I argue, consistent with the spirit of his work
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DOI 10.5840/idstudies20053513
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Altaf Hossain (2007). Gadamer's Hermeneutics. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 11:69-78.

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