Abstract
The notion of "seeing the object itself," basic in husserl's theory of knowledge, Can only make sense, If we interpret it with the help of his notion of horizon or implicit context. Seeing the object itself is an achievement experienced as such. This must mean that the subject has an implicit awareness of a context of other possible epistemic situations in which what is now "seen" or viewed "close up" can be referred to from a "distance." "distance" is here of course not to be understood in a purely objective spatial sense. What distance, If any, Separates him from the object is a function of what cognitive steps, If any, The subject is aware of as steps he might take in order to obtain a better grasp of the object. It is beyond the scope of this article to study how this purely phenomenological contrast between modes of intentionality precisely functions within husserl's epistemology as a whole. This would require a thorough discussion of his concepts of 'evidenz' and truth and of the way in which he confronts skepticism