Intentional identity revisited

The problem of intentional identity, as originally offered by Peter Geach, says that there can be an anaphoric link between an indefinite term and a pronoun across a sentential boundary and across propositional attitude contexts, where the actual existence of an individual for the indefinite term is not presupposed. In this paper, a semantic resolution to this elusive puzzle is suggested, based on a new quantified intensional logic and game-theoretic semantics of imperfect information. This constellation leads to an expressive intensional language with a property of informational independence, argued to produce a purely semantic explication to intentional identity statements. One consequence is that various extra-logical and pragmatic factors become of secondary concern; it is possible to solve the puzzle by logico-semantic methods, albeit somewhat radically renewed ones
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DOI 10.1080/080662001753275954
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References found in this work BETA
Aarne Ranta (1994). Type-Theoretical Grammar. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
P. T. Geach (1967). Intentional Identity. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.
Jon Barwise (1979). On Branching Quantifiers in English. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):47 - 80.

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