The Neutral State and the Mandatory Crucifix
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Religion and Human Rights 6 (3):259–264 (2011)
In this article we present a conceptual overview of relevant interpretations of what state neutrality may imply; we suggest a distinction between inclusive neutrality and exclusive neutrality. This distinction provides a useful framework for understanding the several positions as presented by the parties in the Lautsi case. We conclude by suggesting a solution of the Lautsi case that might provide a more viable solution.
|Keywords||neutrality crucifix Lautsi liberalism European Court if Human Rights|
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Roland Pierik & Wibren Van der Burg (2014). What Is Neutrality? Ratio Juris 27 (4):496-515.
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